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Abstract
SRAM-based FPGAs are increasingly popular in the aerospace industry due
to their field programmability and low cost. However, they suffer from cosmic
radiation induced Single Event Upsets (SEUs). In safety-critical applications,
the dependability of the design is a prime concern since failures may have
catastrophic consequences. An early analysis of the relationship between de-
pendability metrics, performability-area trade-off, and different mitigation
techniques for such applications can reduce the design effort while increasing
the design confidence. This paper introduces a novel methodology based on
probabilistic model checking, for the analysis of the reliability, availability,
safety and performance-area tradeoffs of safety-critical systems for early de-
sign decisions. Starting from the high-level description of a system, a Markov
reward model is constructed from the Control Data Flow Graph (CDFG) and
a component characterization library targeting FPGAs. The proposed model
and exhaustive analysis capture all the failure states (based on the fault de-
tection coverage) and repairs possible in the system. We present quantitative
results based on an FIR filter circuit to illustrate the applicability of the pro-
posed approach and to demonstrate that a wide range of useful dependability
and performability properties can be analyzed using the proposed methodol-
ogy. The modeling results show the relationship between different mitigation
techniques and fault detection coverage, exposing their direct impact on the
design for early decisions.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
With respect to power consumption and speed, reconfigurable computing
with Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) can outperform general-
purpose CPUs, and due to their field programmability, absence of non-
recurring engineering costs, low manufacturing costs and other advantages,
SRAM-based FPGAs are increasingly attractive compared to Application-
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). Unfortunately, a great disadvantage
of these devices is their sensitivity to radiation effects which can cause bit
flips in memory elements and ionisation induced transient faults in semicon-
ductors, commonly known as Single Event Upsets (SEUs) [1, 2]. Different
vendors have provided radiation hardened FPGAs to meet the requirements
of the avionic and space industries [3]. However, these devices are very ex-
pensive as they are manufactured in relatively low volumes and they also
lag by two or three technology nodes (28-nm1 CMOS2, 45-nm CMOS, 65-nm
CMOS etc.) when compared to commercial products. Therefore, there is a
growing need to analyze the possible utilization of commercial SRAM-based
FPGA components in harsh radioactive environments such as outer space.
To deal with SEUs, designers mostly rely on redundancy-based solutions,
such as Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [4] for high reliability, and config-
uration memory (Configuration Bits) scrubbing [2] in order to mitigate SEUs
and to gain high availability. Scrubbing is traditionally done in the order of
milliseconds, however such fast scrubbing consumes high power [5, 6] and
hence scrubbing at a lower frequency is desired [7]. The strict power budgets
typical of deep space missions such as Voyager-1, Voyager-2 [8], and even the
Mars missions have produced a need for delayed scrubs (in the order of hours
or days) to save power. Scrubbing is often used in conjunction with other
forms of mitigation techniques such as TMR or spare components, to increase
1nm = nanometer
2CMOS = Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor
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reliability. However, in cases where performability (reliability and perfor-
mance combined) is a major concern, redundancy-based solutions might not
always be the default choice [9]. Much of the literature also reported ap-
proaches for safety modeling, and dependability improvement mostly based
on improving the fault detection coverage [10, 11, 12]. Unfortunately the
relationship between fault detection coverage, scrub interval, redundancy,
rescheduling [13, 14], performability-area trade-off, and how these impact
each other in the early design option evaluation was ignored. Always setting
a target of 100% fault detection coverage is expensive in terms of time and
cost and is unnecessary in many cases. That is why, to choose the right
design options and parameters, it is important to evaluate the relationship
between the reliability, availability, safety, performability with the adopted
fault mitigation technique, fault detection coverage and mission time. Such
analysis at an early design stage will allow the designer to develop more re-
liable and efficient solutions, and may also reduce the overall cost associated
with the design effort. Our work aims to achieve these goals.
1.2. Contributions and Limitations of Previously Reported Approaches
This paper proposes a methodology that can be applied at early design
stages to evaluate various design options of reconfigurable systems in terms of
dependability and performability-area tradeoff. The proposed methodology
is based on probabilistic model checking [15]. The main advantage of using
probabilistic model checking is the exhaustive nature of the analysis, which
results in numerically exact answers to temporal logic queries [16]. This
contrasts with discrete-event simulations in which approximate results are
generated by averaging results from a large number of random samples.
Using our approach, for each design option, a Markov chain dependabil-
ity model is constructed from the Control Data Flow Graph (CDFG) rep-
resentation of the system under analysis. The Markov chain dependability
model captures all the possible components failures considering their fault
detection coverage parameters, and possible recovery by rescheduling and
scrubbing. Each state of the model is then augmented with associated per-
formance and area rewards obtained using the high-level synthesis technique.
The cumulative reward of this single Markov Reward Model (MRM) [17] is
then used to evaluate the corresponding design option in terms of reliability,
availability, safety and performability-area trade-off. Current work in this
area [18, 19, 20, 10] either separates the dependability analysis from perfor-
mance/area, coverage analysis, or does not analyze such safety-critical appli-
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cations at an early design stage. Commercial tools for dependability analysis,
such as isograph [21], concentrate mainly on the reliability and availability
analysis and lack the support for performability evaluation. Since the PRISM
probabilistic model checker [22] allows reward modeling, our work overcomes
this limitation.
Our previously proposed modeling method was limited to only reliability,
availability and performability-area trade-off evaluation [9], hence it was not
possible to reason about the system’s safety, or the relationship between the
fault detection coverage with fault mitigation parameters. In this work, we
extend our previous model by capturing the concept of safety using the notion
of fault detection coverage. The quantitative results from our obtained model
show some important observations such as the fact that high fault detection
coverage is not always helpful for gaining high reliability, and that scrubbing
delay also has a considerable impact. In terms of safety, we also show how
the scrubbing interval affects the safety of available design options with the
same fault detection coverage.
Our analysis also shows that redundancy may fail to improve reliability
if it has lower fault detection coverage compared to a design with no redun-
dancy but high fault detection coverage for some cases. For performability-
area trade-off analysis, in our previous work, we showed that redundancy-
based solutions might not always be the best choice as one may expect. Al-
ternatively, for those cases, rescheduling in conjunction with scrubbing can
be a good option. In this paper, we observe that if the scrub interval is small,
our conclusion holds [9], even for a lower fault detection coverage. On the
other hand, for a longer scrub interval, the design options show a different
trend while we vary the fault detection coverage. To our knowledge, this is
the first attempt to evaluate such relationships at early design stages using
probabilistic model checking.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
some basic concepts about dependability metrics, the background of SEU
effects, SEU mitigation techniques and probabilistic model checking. Section
3 reviews CDFG rescheduling and related works. The proposed methodology
and modeling details are discussed in section 4, and in section 5, we present
quantitative results from an FIR filter case study illustrating our proposed
methodology. Section 6 concludes the paper with future research directions.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Single Event Upsets
FPGAs are configurable logic devices that implement logic circuits with a
fabric that includes Look-up tables (LUTs), memories and routing resources
that connect the LUTs and memories. In a reconfigurable FPGA, the con-
figuration memory is a collection of bits commonly known as a bitstream.
Bitstream bits set the values of the LUT, flip-flop and memory initializa-
tion values, and states of switches and connection boxes that route signals
through the FPGA. For Virtex devices from Xilinx, the configuration mem-
ory is composed of SRAM cells. Since the FPGA configuration bitstream
is stored in volatile SRAMs, interaction with high-energy radiated particles
that are common in the aerospace environment, such as protons, neutrons,
and heavy ions, may corrupt the FPGA configuration. The effects of these
particles on electronics are collectively known as Single-Event Effects (SEE)
and there are several types of SEE that are relevant to FPGAs. Single Event
Upsets (SEUs) occur when one or more bits in configuration memory changes
state due to a radiation event. The state of the FPGA configuration mem-
ory defines the architecture of the application. As a consequence, SEUs in
the configuration memory are not only harmful but also could result in the
catastrophic failure of the design.
2.2. Scrubbing
Data scrubbing is a well-known technique for error correction. It uses a
background task that periodically inspects memory for errors and corrects the
errors using Error-Correcting Code (ECC) memory or the protected duplicate
copy of data. Scrubbing in FPGAs such as Xilinx uses a similar approach for
scrubbing the configuration memory. FPGA scrubbing is divided into dif-
ferent categories based on the type of implementation (external vs internal),
and based also on the scrubbing strategy (blind vs read-back) [23]. A scrub-
bing strategy is composed of at least one correction technique and, optionally,
a detection technique. External blind scrubbing, which is modeled in this
paper, is a very popular and reliable scrubbing strategy that requires no ad-
ditional detection algorithm before fixing the configuration-memory upsets.
Correction techniques for external blind scrub usually use off-chip rad-hard
memory to store the golden file (also known as the golden data or golden
bitstream - which is a copy of the initial configuration memory loaded onto
the device) and then periodically (or continuously) reconfigures the FPGA
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with that golden bitstream to repair the SEUs. The blind scrubbing strategy
is very popular in FPGA-based space platforms because of its effectiveness
(they can fix any number of upsets) and simplicity (less implementation
complexity). Since frequent scrubbing drains power, for many power-aware
space applications delayed scrubbing is a good choice [24]. Scrubbing can
be performed at a specified rate, meaning that there might be a period of
time between the moment the upset occurs and the moment when it is re-
paired. That is why scrubbing is usually implemented with another form of
mitigation, such as a redundancy-based solution known as TMR [4].
2.3. Probabilistic Model Checking
Model checking [25] is a well-established technique used in both industry
and academia to verify the correctness of finite-state concurrent systems.
In contrast, Probabilistic model checking deals with systems that exhibit
stochastic behaviour, and is based on the construction and analysis of a
probabilistic model of the system, typically a Markov chain. In this paper,
we focus on the Continuous-time Markov Chains (CTMCs) and Markov re-
ward models [17] widely used for reliability and performance analysis.
Definition 1. A (labeled) CTMC M is a tuple (S, R, L) with S as a finite
set of states, R : S × S → R≥0 is the rate matrix, and L :−→ 2
AP is the
labeling function that assigns every state s ∈ S a set L(s) of atomic proposi-
tions a ∈ AP which are valid in s.
The rate R(s, s′) defines the delay before which a transition between the
states s and s′ takes place. Intuitively, R(s, s′) ≥ 0 iff there is a transition
from s to s′. Furthermore, 1−e−R(s,s
′)×t is the probability that the transition
s −→ s′ can be triggered within t time unit. Such exponentially distributed
delays are suitable for modelling component lifetimes and inter-arrival times.
If R(s, s′) ≥ 0 for more than one state s′, then it initiates a competition
between these transitions originating in s, commonly known as the race con-
dition.
Remark 1. We allow self-loops in our CTMC model, and according to
Definition 1, self-loops at state s are possible and are modeled by having
R(s, s) > 0. The inclusion of self-loops neither alters the transient nor the
steady-state behavior of the CTMC, but allows the usual interpretation of
Linear-Time Temporal (LTL) operators (we refer the interested reader to [26]
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for more details about the syntax and semantics of LTL) like the next step
(X ) that we will exploit in Section 5 to check the correctness of the model.
In the Probabilistic model checking approach using CTMCs, properties
are usually expressed in some form of extended temporal logic such as Con-
tinuous Stochastic Logic (CSL), a stochastic variant of the well-known Com-
putational Tree Logic (CTL) [25].
Definition 2. A CSL formula Φ defined over a CTMCM is one of the form:
Φ ::= true | a | Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | S⊲⊳p(Φ) | P⊲⊳p(φ)
φ ::= XΦ | ΦUΦ | ΦU≤tΦ
where a ∈ AP is an atomic propositions, p ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ R>0 and ⊲⊳∈ {<,≤
,≥, >}. Each Φ is known as a state formula and each φ is known as a path
formula.
The detailed syntax and semantics of CSL can be found in [27]. In CSL,
S⊲⊳ p(Φ) asserts that the steady-state probability for a Φ state meets the
boundary condition ⊲⊳ p. On the other hand, P⊲⊳ p(φ) asserts that the prob-
ability measure of the paths satisfying φ meets the bound given by ⊲⊳ p.
The meaning of the temporal operator U and X is standard (same as in
LTL). The temporal operator U≤t is the real-time invariant of U . Temporal
operators like always (), eventually (♦) and their real-time variants (≤t
and ♦≤t) can also be derived from the CSL semantics. Below, we show some
illustrative examples with their natural language translations:
1. failure ⇒ P≥0.95[¬ fail U
≤200 up] - “Once a failure has occurred, with
probability 0.95 or greater, the system will successfully recover within 200
hours and without any further failures occurring”.
2. P≥0.98[♦ complete] - “The probability of the system eventually completing
its execution successfully is at least 0.98”.
3. S≤10−9 [Failure] - “In the long run, the probability that a failure condition
can occur is less than or equal to 10−9 ”.
In the PRISM property specification language P, S, G, F, X and U oper-
ators are used to refer to the P,S,,♦,X and U operator. In addition,
PRISM also supports the expression P =?[φ] and S =?[Φ] in order to com-
pute the actual probability of the formula φ and Φ being satisfied. Additional
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properties can be specified by adding the notion of rewards (the R operator)
to CSL [28]. Each state (and/or transition) of the model is assigned a real-
valued reward, allowing queries such as:
R=?[♦ success] - “What is the expected reward accumulated before the sys-
tem successfully terminates?”.
Rewards can be used to specify a wide range of measures of interest, for
example, the number of correctly delivered packets or the time that the
system is operational. Of course, conversely, the rewards can be consid-
ered as costs, such as power consumption, expected number of failures, etc.
PRISM also allows the use of customized properties using the filter opera-
tor: filter(op, prop, states), where op represents the filter operator (such as
forall, print, min, max, etc.), prop represents the PRISM property and states
(optional) represents the set of states over which to apply the filter.
3. Rescheduling-based Fault Recovery and Related Works
3.1. CDFG Rescheduling
Let us consider the CDFG of a synchronous dataflow DSP application
shown in Figure 1(a). Based on data dependencies, this application can be
carried out in a minimum of three control steps (csteps) using the CDFG-1
shown in Figure 1(b), with two adders and two multipliers. Such an imple-
mentation provides a throughput of 1/3 = 0.33 (for non-pipelined systems,
throughput is the inverse of latency [29, 30], throughput modeling will be
addressed later in this paper). Another alternative consists of implementing
the application with only one multiplier and two adders but in four control
steps, as shown by CDFG-2 in Figure 1(c). In this case the throughput
is 0.25. Considering the priority of the throughput or area metric, the ap-
propriate CDFG can be selected. Based on this idea, when a resource fails
(due to a configuration bit flip), an alternative schedule can be derived to
continue the system operation using the remaining resources, most likely at
a lower throughput. For instance, to maximize the throughput, let us con-
sider that CDFG-1 is implemented. For a single component failure, e.g. a
multiplier, the application can be rescheduled to implement CDFG-2 with a
lower throughput. Such a rescheduling-based fault tolerance approach was
introduced in [13, 14, 31] for fault-secure microarchitectures and multipro-
cessors (a computation on a set of processors is fault-secure if no fault in the
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Figure 1: CDFGs scheduled over available resources
computation generated by a faulty processor goes undetected). For FPGA-
based designs, such a fault recovery technique can be adopted as well and we
explore the dependability and performability-area tradeoffs for such systems.
It is of interest that the controller for rescheduling the operations is assumed
to be fault-free. This controller can be implemented in a separate chip with
proper fault-tolerance mechanisms.
3.2. Related Works
For many years, dependability analysis of complex safety-critical systems
has been an active research area in both academia and industry. Hence,
researchers have put a lot of efforts in analyzing fault tolerant systems. In
[32], the authors proposed a reliability-centric high-level synthesis approach
to address SEUs. Their framework uses reliability characterization to select
the most reliable implementation for each operation fulfilling latency and
area constraints. In addition, researchers have dedicated considerable effort
to modeling the behavior of gracefully degradable large-scale systems using
continuous-time Markov reward models [33, 34]. In [35], the authors present
the modeling and analysis of fault trees based on stochastic logic. To pro-
duce the models, probabilistic analysis of all different types of gates is carried
out first, and then the probability models are converted to their equivalent
stochastic logic gates. Compared to Markov chains, a classical fault tree is
limited for modeling only non-repairable systems. The impact of fault detec-
tion coverage on reliability with quantitative assessment on different types of
systems were performed and reported in [36, 37, 38]. However, the relation-
ship between different fault mitigation approaches for early design analysis
was not explored in any of these works. In [39], a case study is presented to
measure the performance of a multiprocessor system using a continuous-time
9
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Figure 2: Proposed methodology
Markov reward model. An approach for analyzing the performance, area and
reliability metric of a design using a Markov reward model is presented in
[20]. The authors used transistor lifetimes to model the reliability and per-
formance, hence the model is composed of non-repairable modules. The use
of a non-formal commercial tool makes their approach quite rigid in terms
of analysis. Moreover, in their proposed approach, the reward calculation
is manual, as the traditional commercial tools for reliability analysis do not
support reward modeling.
Even though our model has some similarities to their work [20], our ap-
proach is more flexible because we use probabilistic model checking. Our
work focuses on a different fault model: cosmic radiation-induced configu-
ration bit-flips in FPGAs. Since scrubbing is possible in FPGA designs, we
also add repair to our Markov reward model. In terms of the failure type,
repair capability, inclusion of fault detection coverage, and use of a charac-
terization library to model the system, the application of our work and our
methodology is different and novel when compared to all the related works
described above.
4. Proposed Methodology
In Figure 2, we present the proposed methodology that starts from the
dataflow graph of the application. The boxes in the methodology represent
the steps, and the edges show the relationship between them. The steps are
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as follows:
1. Dataflow graph: The CDFG is extracted from a high-level design descrip-
tion expressed in C++. The idea is inspired from [40], however, we use a
different tool known as GAUT [41] for this purpose.
2. Configuration: As mentioned earlier, a CDFG can be implemented with
different component allocations (design options). To analyze each configura-
tion, we model them with the PRISM modeling language. From now on, we
will refer to the term design options as configurations in the rest of the paper.
3. PRISM modeling: PRISM modeling requires the description of a given
system in terms of component failure rates, adopted fault mitigation strategy,
fault detection coverage and performance measures. To acquire the compo-
nent failure rate, we use a characterization library (characterization library
is explained in section 4.4). The modeled fault mitigation techniques are:
rescheduling, cold spare components and blind scrubbing. For rescheduling
a CDFG, with available components if possible, a high-level synthesis algo-
rithm, such as forced-directed list scheduling [42] can be used. Since the model
is parametric, the fault detection coverage and the scrub interval can be var-
ied for analysis. Each state of this Markov model can be augmented with
associated rewards such as throughput (obtained using high-level synthesis
techniques: CDFG scheduling with available components in each state), area
(measured in terms of the total number of LUTs required to implement the
design, obtained from the component characterization library) or any other
metric of interest. The resulting Markov Reward Model is then analyzed
using the PRISM model checker tool.
4. PRISM model checker: The PRISM tool then computes the set of all states
which are reachable from the initial state and identifies any deadlock states
(i.e. reachable states with no outgoing transitions). PRISM then parses one
or more temporal logic properties (e.g. in CSL) and performs model check-
ing, determining whether the model satisfies each property or compute the
actual probability.
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4.1. Markov Modeling of Reliability and Availability
CTMC models are very commonly used for modeling the dependability
of gracefully degradable systems. Each state in a CTMC model represent-
ing a specific configuration can be classified into different types depending
on the number of healthy components. For instance, the FIR filter in Fig-
ure 7 (quantitative results section) requires at a minimum an adder and a
multiplier for successful operation. Hence, any state that does not fulfill the
minimum resource availability is labeled as a failed state. At the end, the
state labeled as all fail represents a state in which all the components in
the system have failed one-by-one due to SEUs. Note that safe and unsafe
failures are not considered at this stage of modeling. How to include safety in
the model will be described in detail in the next subsection. The initial state
of a configuration has the maximum throughput and all the components are
functional. The assumptions for our modeling are defined as follows:
Assumption 1 : All the components fail independently and the time-to-failure
for a component due to a configuration bit flip is exponentially distributed.
Exponential distributions are commonly used to model the reliability of sys-
tems where the failure rate is constant. The scrub interval is assumed to
follow an exponential distribution as well [43, 44, 45], with a rate, µ = 1/τ ,
where τ represents the scrub interval. A scrub process that follows a deter-
ministic time delay can be modeled using the Erlang process [46, 24, 47, 48]
which is considered as a part of our future works [49].
Assumption 2 : Every component in the system is connected with the other
components (via multiplexers). This assumption is needed for the simplicity
of the hardware model. The control unit can be designed as a finite state
machine implemented either as a hardwired or microcoded controller. Since
in many systems datapath components dominate the area of the design com-
pared to control units, these components can be much more vulnerable to
SEU than control units. Hence, we only consider the failures of the datapath
components in this work, and the modeling of control units is left for future
works.
Assumption 3 : Cold spare components are used to provide redundancy and
are active only when the same type of component fails. The cold spare com-
ponents are only error-prone due to cosmic radiations when they are active.
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Assumption 4 : The reconfiguration and rescheduling times (i.e. the time
taken for the system to reschedule when a component fails and the time
taken for repair via scrubbing) are extremely small compared to the times
between failures and repairs. The time required for rescheduling is at most a
few clock cycles and the time required for scrubbing is only a few milliseconds.
Assumption 5 : All the states in the CTMC model can be classified into three
types: operational, where all the components are functional and the system
has the highest throughput; degraded, where at least one of the components
is faulty; and failed, where the number of remaining non-faulty components
is not sufficient to perform successful operation and hence has a throughput
of 0. In PRISM, a formula can be used to classify such states as shown in
the PRISM code.
Our model is described as a number of modules in PRISM, each of which
corresponds to a component of the system. Each module has a set of finite-
ranged variables representing different types of resources. The domain of
the variables represents the number of available components of a specific
resource. The whole model is constructed as the parallel composition of
these modules. The behaviour of an individual module is specified by a set
of guarded commands in the following form:
[act] <guard> → <rate> : <update> ;
where act is an (optional) action label and the guard is a predicate over the
variables of all the modules in the model. A rate is an expression which
evaluates to a positive real number and the update is of the form:
(z′1 = v1) & (z
′
2 = v2) & ..... & (z
′
n = vn) ;
where z1, z2, ...., zn are the local variables of the module and v1, v2, ....vn are
expressions over all variable of the model. The interpretation of the command
is that if the guard is satisfied, then the module can make the corresponding
transition with that associated rate. A very simple command for a module
with only one variable z might be:
[ ] (z = 0) → 7.5 : (z′ = z + 1) ;
which states that if z is equal to 0, then it will be incremented by one and
this action occurs with a rate of 7.5. A second more significant example, is
13
module adder
a : [0.. num_A] init num_A;
[] (a > 0) -> a*lambda_A : (a’ = a - 1);
[rep] (a <= num_A) -> miu : (a’ = num_A);
endmodule
module mult
m : [0.. num_M] init num_M;
[] (m > 0) -> m*lambda_M : (m’ = m - 1);
[rep] (m <= num_M) -> 1 : (m’ = num_M);
endmodule
formula fail = (a =0)|(m =0);
formula oper = (a=num_A)&(m=num_M);
formula degrade = !fail & !oper;
Figure 3: PRISM modeling for a system with 2-adders and 2-multipliers
an application that implements a function using 2 adders and 2 multipliers
but requires at least 1 adder and 1 multiplier (in the case of failure due to
SEU) for successful operation. Such a configuration in the PRISM model-
ing language can be described as shown in Figure 3. Once each module is
specified in such a manner, the PRISM model checker then performs a par-
allel composition of all the modules to build the complete Markov chain of
the system specified. To model interactions between multiple modules, i.e.
simultaneous changes in their state, we use synchronisation, which is spec-
ified by augmenting guarded commands with action labels. The rate of a
synchronous (combined) transition is defined as the product of the rates for
each command.
In the PRISM code shown in Figure 3, num A and num M represent the num-
ber of adders and multipliers available in the initial state of the configu-
ration. The lambda A and the lambda M variables represent the associated
failure rates of the adders and multipliers, whereas miu represents the repair
rate. Each repair transition (scrub) leads back to the initial state, reflecting
the scenario in which the configuration bit flips have been repaired. The
value of lambda A and lambda M is obtained from a component character-
ization library, which will be explained later in the paper. PRISM then
constructs, from this, the corresponding probabilistic model, in this case a
CTMC. The resulting CTMC for this configuration is shown in Figure 4
(lambda A, lambda M, miu, a and m are reflected in the figure as λA, λM , µ,
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Figure 4: Sample CTMC for reliability/availability analysis
A and M respectively). The repair commands in the code use the action
label [rep] to synchronise the repair transitions between module adder and
module mult. This demonstrates a phenomenon where, when the FPGA is
scrubbed, all the components get fixed simultaneously. The intended repair
rate is fully specified in module adder and in module mult specified as 1.
As mentioned earlier, this is due to the fact that the rate of the synchro-
nised transition is the product of the rates for each command. The formula
fail, oper and degrade classifies failed, operational and degraded states in the
model.
4.2. Safety Modeling using Fault Detection Coverage
From the reliability point of view, all failures are equal. However, from
the perspective of safety, failures can be divided into safe and unsafe ones.
Definition 3: The safety S(t) of a system at time t is the probability that
the system either performs its function correctly, or discontinues its operation
in a fail-safe manner in the interval [0,t ] given that the system was operating
correctly at time 0.
Any fault detection algorithm can be assumed to detect and handle all the
faults properly; however, in reality this is not the case. A fault can escape
the implemented fault detection mechanism. The fault detection coverage
(or simply fault coverage3) of a component can be defined by a conditional
3fault coverage and coverage both refer to the term fault detection coverage throughout
15
probability C, that given the existence of a fault, the system detects it [50] :
C = P (fault detection|fault existence)
For instance, a typical industrial requirement is that 99% of single stuck-
at faults are detected during manufacturing tests of ASICs [51]. The fault
detection coverage C = 0.99 (a perfect fault detection coverage refers to C
= 1) can be used as the measure of the system’s ability to meet such a re-
quirement which can be validated using simulation or emulation based fault
injection techniques [52, 53]. It is worth mentioning that with increasing
fault detection coverage requirement, the cost of test development and test
application also increases rapidly. Hence, it is necessary to analyze the rela-
tionship between the dependability metrics and the fault detection coverage
at early design stages. This will enable the designers to set the target fault
detection coverage for the design to be implemented based on the depend-
ability requirements instead of aiming at an unnecessary higher coverage
value.
In our case, if a fault escapes the detection mechanism then the system
will not be able to reschedule, hence the system will continue its operation
in a faulty mode. This means that each component in the configuration that
implements the CDFG can fail either in a safe or in an unsafe fashion. This
is why we need to refine the model by taking the fault detection coverage into
account while introducing the concept of the safe failure and unsafe failure.
We define them as follows:
Definition 4: Safe failure is when a component fails due to an SEU, which
is detected and handled by rescheduling depending on the number of remain-
ing components. If the number of remaining components are not sufficient
for rescheduling, the system moves to a fail safe state.
Definition 5: An Unsafe failure is defined as the fail silent behavior, e.g.
when a system fails to detect a component’s failure.
If all the faults are safely detected, it will eventually lead to the failed safe
state, whereas even if there is a single Unsafe failure occurrence, it will
this paper.
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Figure 5: Safety modeling of simple system with safe and unsafe failure
immediately lead to the failed unsafe state.
Figure 5 shows the modeling of safety for a simple single component sys-
tem with only two adders including the repair transitions. For this case,
we assume that the system requires at least one adder for a successful add
operation. Initially the system is in the operational mode with two adders.
When one adder fails, if the failure is detected, the system is rescheduled
and continues with only one adder. This Safe failure is modeled using the
transition from state 2A to state 1A with a rate of C ∗ 2λA, where C refers
to the fault detection coverage and λA refers to the failure rate of an adder.
If the failure is not detected, then it moves to the Failed unsafe state and
this situation is modeled using the transition from state 2A to state Failed
unsafe with a rate of (1 − C) ∗ 2λA. If another adder fails, the system will
not be able to continue its operations, hence it will fail safely leading to the
Failed safe state. However, if this failure is not detected, then the system will
eventually fail in an unsafe fashion. Inclusion of safety in the model requires
the modification of assumption 5 as follows:
Assumption 5 : All the states in the CTMC model can be classified into four
types:
1. operational - All the components are functional and the system has the
highest throughput.
2. degraded - At least one of the components is faulty.
3. failed safe - The number of remaining non-faulty components is not suf-
ficient to perform successful operation and hence has a throughput of 0. To
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module adder
a : [0..num_A +1] init num_A;
[] (a > 0 & (a < num_A+1)) -> c*a*lambda_A :
(a’=a-1) + a*(1-c)*lambda_A : (a’= num_A+1);
[rep] (a >= 0 ) -> repair : (a’=num_A);
endmodule
module mult
m : [0..num_M +1] init num_M;
[] (m > 0 & (m < num_M +1)) -> c*m*lambda_M :
(m’=m-1) + m*(1-c)*lambda_M : (m’= num_M+1);
[rep] (m >= 0) -> 1 : (m’=num_M);
endmodule
formula fail_unsafe=((a=num_A +1)|(m=num_M +1));
formula fail_safe=((a=0)|(m=0))& !fail_unsafe;
formula oper =(a=num_A)&(m=num_M);
formula degrade=! fail_safe&! fail_unsafe&!oper;
Figure 6: PRISM modeling refined after inclusion of coverage (c) for a system with 2-
adders and 2-multipliers
reach the failed safe state, all the failures leading to this state must be Safe
failures.
4. failed unsafe - At least one failure is not detected by the detection algo-
rithm. Unsafe failure of a component immediately leads to the failed unsafe
state.
Figure 6 shows the modified PRISM code from Figure 3 after including
the fault detection coverage variable c in the model.
4.3. Peformability Modeling using MRM
When a system changes its state from one to another one due to a full/-
partial failure or repair, the performance level can change. Such a scenario
can be described by different states using a Markov model that provides
a framework for combined performance-reliability (performability) analysis.
Formally, an MRM consists of a CTMC X = X(t), t > 0 with finite states
space S, and a reward function r where r : S → R [54]. For each state i ∈ S,
ri denotes the reward obtained per unit time spent by X in that state which
represents the performance level given by the system while it is in that state.
Performability measures can be distinguished in different classes, mainly
into two: steady-state performability and transient or point performability.
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For i ∈ S, let wi denote the steady-state probability of residing in state i,
and pi(t) the (transient) probability of residing in state i at time t. Given
that, expected steady-state performability can be defined as:
E[XSP ] =
∑
i∈S
wi ∗ ri (1)
Expected transient or point performability can be defined as:
E[X(t)PP ] =
∑
i∈S
pi(t) ∗ ri (2)
Markov Reward Modeling for the CDFG: For a data-flow system, the
primary reward associated with each state of the MRM is throughput. For
a synchronous data-flow system, the throughput can be evaluated directly
from the CDFG of the system. As we consider only non-pipelined systems
in this paper, we can define the throughput as the inverse of the number of
seconds it takes to execute the CDFG:
Throughput = (1/cstep) ∗ (cstep/cycle) ∗ (cycles/second) (3)
where, cstep is the number of control steps in the CDFG. Assuming that each
cstep takes a single clock cycle and η represents the system’s clock frequency
(clock cycle/second):
Throughput = (1/cstep) ∗ η (4)
In our MRM, the operational and degraded states are augmented with
associated throughput reward, and all the failed states both safe and un-
safe ones, are augmented with a throughput reward of zero. The expected
throughput (for long run E[X ] or for a specific mission time E[X(t)]) can
be calculated using the equation 1 and equation 2 respecively. In our MRM
model, the area that is required, to implement the design on the FPGA,
is assumed to be invariant between the states for a specific configuration.
The reason is, once the system is implemented on FPGA, the area is fixed
(in terms of the total number of LUTs) and if a fault occurs, then the sys-
tem will be rescheduled or if it fails, then eventually will be scrubbed. So
only the control signals will change, not the components. For overall reward
calculation e.g. to evaluate the throughput-area-reliability trade-offs for a
configuration, we use the following equation:
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Table 1: Characterization library
Component No. of No. of MTBF
LUTs essential bits (days)
Wallace Tree Multiplier 722 133503 11.85
Booth Multiplier 650 130781 12.11
Brant-Kung adder 120 29675 53.36
Kogge-Stone Adder 183 41499 38.15
Overall reward = (1/A) ∗ E[X ] (5)
In the above equation, A represents the area of the design and E[X ] rep-
resents the expected throughput. This equation is similar to [55], however
instead of calculating the reward up to a specified time-step, we use the no-
tion of steady-state throughput (E[X ] = E[XSP ]). Such modeling can be
considered as a direct optimization of throughput, area and reliability. Re-
wards can be weighted based on designer’s requirements. For the case study
presented in this paper, the rewards are set to equal weight.
4.4. Characterization Library
As the SEU rate λ is highly dependent on device process technology,
architecture, and orbits of interest, so this parameter is different for each
device family. We use CREME96 [56] with radiation cross sections from [57]
to find per bit upset rate λbit for Xilinx Virtex-5 in the Highly Elliptical Orbit
(HEO) and Low Earth Orbit(LEO) orbit. The failure rate for a component
can be calculated using the equation as follows:
λcomponent = λbit ×Number of critical bits (6)
For our experiments, λbit = 7.31× 10
−12 SEUs/bit/sec for the HEO orbit.
In order to build a component characterization library that represents
the first-order estimation of the SEU effects on the components, we use the
bitgen feature of Xilinx ISE tool. Using bitgen, we identified the essential
bits which are also known as potentially critical bits. Essential bits are subset
of total configuration bits (defined by Xilinx) and they refer to the amount
of configuration bits associated with a design mapped in the FPGA. If an
essential bit encounters an upset, it changes the design circuitry. However,
the upset might not affect the function of the design. In contrast, critical
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bits are defined as those configuration bits that cause a functional failure
if they change state. The critical bits are the subset of the essential bits.
Note that, it is well known that the number of critical bits is less than the
number of potentially critical bits. More accurate SEU susceptibility analysis
can be performed using the fault injection techniques [58, 59], however, for
first-order worst-case estimation, it is valid to assume that all the essential
bits are considered as critical bits. Note that we use the characterization
library to obtain the failure rate of the components for the Markov chain
model and the methodology is generic enough to be used with a different
characterization library with more precise and accurate data, without any
major changes.
Table 1 presents a first-order worst-case estimate of component failures
due to SEUs. We characterize different adder and multiplier components,
namely 64-bit Brent-kung adder, 64-bit Kogge-stone adder, 32-bit Wallace-
tree multiplier and 32-bit Booth multiplier. The Xilinx Synthesis Technology
(XST) tool is used to synthesize the components for Virtex-5 XC5VLX50T
device from their HDL codes and the number of required LUTs to implement
them (area) is also obtained. We observe that a 32-bit Wallace-tree multiplier
has about 0.134 million bits that are sensitive to SEUs. So this multiplier has
a worst-case Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 11.85 days for space
applications in the HEO orbit. MTBF and λ are related to each other using
the following equation [60]:
λ =
1
MTBF
(7)
5. Quantitative Analysis using PRISM
To illustrate the applicability of the proposed methodology for early de-
sign decision, this section presents a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filter
case study from a high-level synthesis benchmark. FIR filters are one of two
primary types of digital filters (the other one is Infinite Impulse Response)
used in Digital Signal Processing (DSP) applications. FIR filters are com-
monly used in spacecrafts for noise filtering from images, videos and sensor
outputs and spacecraft antennas [61, 62, 63].
Figure 7 shows the CDFG for a 16-point FIR Filter [31] obtained from
[64]. To achieve a schedule with minimum number of control steps, the
minimum allocation is two adders and two multipliers for the FIR filter ap-
plication. At a minimum a pair of one adder and one multiplier is required
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Figure 7: CDFG of an FIR filter
Table 2: Available design options to evaluate
No. Configuration Spare Scrubbing Rescheduling
C1 2A 2M None X X
C2 2A 3M 1 Mul X X
C3 3A 2M 1 Add X X
C4 3A 3M 1 Add, 1 Mul X X
for successful operation. For our experiments, we consider the 32-bit Kogge-
stone adders and 32-bit Wallace tree multipliers as available components from
the characterization library, as they require less area (number of LUTs) to
implement compared to the others in the characterization library. We must
mention that any other adder or multiplier from the component characteri-
zation library can be used for the similar analysis. The first part of the case
study presents the dependability analysis on different configurations. The
latter part of the case study focuses on the performability (throughput with
reliability) analysis and overall reward calculation. Overall reward (equa-
tion 5) gives the expected reward with both area and throughput taken into
consideration.
Table 2 shows the different configurations to evaluate the FIR filter de-
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sign and its respective fault mitigation strategies. The first configuration
consists of two adders and two multipliers with no redundancy. The second
and third configuration consists of one spare multiplier and one spare adder
respectively used as redundant components (coldspare). Configuration 4 is
equipped with full component-level redundancy, with a spare of each type of
components. All the four configurations employ scrubbing and rescheduling.
In rest of the paper, configurations 1, 2, 3 and 4 will be referred to as C1,
C2, C3 and C4 respectively. Also, for brevity when reporting experimen-
tal results, the scrub interval and fault detection coverage will be denoted
by I (in days) and C, respectively, and their units, when applicable, will be
omitted. Before analyzing the model quantitatively, we verify the following
LTL style properties (Recall Remark 1) to check the correctness of the model:
Correctness Property: filter(forall, P > 0 [X oper]) - “From any reachable
state, it is possible to reach the oper state in the next step with a probability
greater than 0 ”.
Note that, as mentioned earlier in the preliminary section, blind scrubbing
periodically reconfigures the FPGA, which does not require any fault detec-
tion. This sets the requirement (specified as the property above) that the
system should be repaired irrespective of its failures, i.e. will be scrubbed
even in the oper state, which justifies the self-loop in our model. While
verifying, PRISM returned true, which means that the correctness property
hold in our model.
In Table 3, using reward-based properties, we analyze the number of days
the design spends in different classes of states for a mission time of 10 years
and fault coverage C = 0.99, with a value of I = 1, 4 and 9. Different states
in the Markov model can be classified into various classes using formulas in
PRISM language. To calculate the number of days spent in different classes
of states, we define a reward structure for each of them. For example, a re-
ward structure degraded assigns a state reward of 1 to all states of the model
in which the system is in degraded mode. A property that can reason about
the amount of rewards accumulated over a period of time, is represented us-
ing CSL logic in PRISM as follows:
Property 1: R{“degraded”} =?[C <= t] - “the expected cumulative time
spent in the degraded mode of the system in the time interval [0, t]”.
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Table 3: Configurations vs classes of states
Config. I Operational Degraded Failure
(days) (days) (days) (days)
C1 1 2989.00 609.04 51.94
4 1937.53 1287.04 425.42
9 1222.40 1378.28 1049.31
C2 1 2989.00 642.82 18.14
4 1937.53 1492.61 219.86
9 1222.40 1711.59 716.00
C3 1 2989.00 613.08 47.91
4 1937.53 1319.58 392.88
9 1222.40 1441.09 986.50
C4 1 2989.00 647.06 13.93
4 1937.53 1531.90 180.55
9 1222.40 1795.97 631.61
The first column of the table shows the different configurations to be
evaluated and the second column shows the associated scrub intervals (I).
The third, fourth, and fifth column presents the number of days the design
spends in different classes of states. It is worth mentioning that the fifth
column shows the days spent in either failed safe or failed unsafe states. All
configurations spend approximately similar number of days in operational
state (rounded to 2 decimal points) for the same scrub intervals. For I = 9,
configuration C1 that has no redundant components shows the worst result.
Interestingly, we observe that adding an extra adder as spare does not help
much whereas adding an extra multiplier as spare significantly reduces the
number of days spent in failed states. In configuration C4, the added spares
for both adder and multiplier provide the best result in terms of availability.
This is obvious but will cost more area on the FPGA. Configuration C1
spends the least number of days and configuration C4 spends the highest
number of days in degraded states. For many safety-critical applications, low
performance for a period of time is acceptable. For such systems the number
of days spent in failed states is a major concern and hence, configuration C4
and configuration C2 are the two best candidates.
Steady state analysis of a design is useful to evaluate its dependability in
the long-run. In Figure 8, we calculate the steady-state failure probability
(safe or unsafe) and compare the results of the four available configurations,
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Figure 8: Failure probability vs I (scrub interval)
with respect to different scrub intervals (I is varied from 1 to 9) and same
coverage (C = 0.99). The steady-sate failure probability for a given configu-
ration can be analyzed in PRISM using the following property:
Property 2: S =? [ failedsafe + failedunsafe ] - “the long-run non-availability
of the system”.
The experimental results show that for configuration C1, the failure proba-
bility varies from 0.014 to 0.288 depending on the value of I. Configuration
C2 has a lower failure probability than configuration C3 for all the scrub
intervals. The failure probability of configuration C4 for all different scrub
rates shows the best result with associated extra area overhead. From the
results, we observe that configuration C2 is really an attractive alternative
to configuration C4 (even for I = 7, the probability varies by only 0.023). On
the other hand, configuration C1 and configuration C3 offer similar results
over the long-run. Another conclusion that can be added is, for a value of
I > 2 , the failure probability increases for all the configurations. For a value
of I ≤ 2, configuration C1 and configuration C3, and, configuration C2 and
configuration C4 has almost same failure probability.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 shows the effect of coverage C on reliability and
safety respectively, for different values of I, for a mission time (T) of maximum
3 months (T is varied from 1 to 90 days). For this part of the experiment (re-
liability and safety analysis), we consider configuration C1 with two adders
and two multipliers, however any other configuration can also be analyzed in
the similar fashion. The properties used to analyze reliability and safety in
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Figure 9: Reliability vs I (scrub interval)
Figure 10: Safety vs scrub I (scrub interval)
PRISM are as follows:
Property 3 (Safety) : P = ? [ G [0, T ] operational | degraded |
failedsafe ] - “The probability that the system will be either in a operational,
degraded, or failed safe state in first T days”.
Property 4 (Reliability) : P = ? [ G [0, T ] operational |
degraded ] - “The probability that the system will be either in a operational
or degraded state in first T days”.
Figure 9 shows some interesting results for reliability evaluation. Configura-
tion C1 has the highest reliability for I = 1 and C = 0.99. We observe that,
with the same coverage, for a delayed scrub of I = 4, configuration C1 has
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Figure 11: Impact of C (coverage) on the design with/without redundancy for I = 1)
lower reliability than the same configuration with I = 1 and C = 0.95. So,
a high coverage does not by itself guarantee a high reliability, particularly
if the scrub interval is long. In contrast, if the scrub interval is fixed, then
increasing the coverage will always increase the reliability. For example, the
design with I = 4 and C = 0.99 has a higher reliability compared with the
design with I = 4 and C = 0.95. In Figure 10, we observe that, for C=0.99,
the safety of the system never goes below 0.83 in the first 3 months, even for
the most delayed scrub interval (I = 9). When we analyze the system for C
= 0.95, it shows how drastically the safety of the system falls. For C = 0.95,
the safety of the system drops up to 0.39 for a mission time of 3 months. It
is also noticeable that if the value of I increases, then the distance between
the safety values also get wider even for the same coverage.
Figure 11 reveals an important observation to compare the available design
options. We compare configuration C1 with no redundancy and configura-
tion C4 with full redundancy for three different values of coverage C and I
= 1 (since the model is parametric, any other parameter combinations can
also be easily evaluated). We observe that, for perfect coverage (C = 1),
indeed the configuration with redundancy gives better reliability. However,
for lower coverage values, such as C = 0.95, configuration C4 with redun-
dancy gives almost the same reliability compared to the configuration C1
with no redundancy with perfect coverage. For even lower coverage value,
redundancy fails to improve the reliability compared to the configuration C1
for the cases where it has better coverage. This experiment shows that a
design option with redundancy is not always the best choice with lower cov-
erage. For instance, all C4 curves for which C < 0.95 produce a reliability
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Figure 12: Impact of C (coverage) on the design with/without redundancy for I = 9)
less than C1 with C = 1. We redo this experiment for a delayed scrub, I =
9 and plot the results in Figure 12. This experiment shows that if a design
option has coverage more that 0.85, then the design option with redundancy
provides a better reliability. From this, we can conclude that, if a system
employs longer scrub interval, then a design option with redundancy can pro-
vide better reliability even with lower coverage, compared with the design
option with no redundancy, with same coverage. However, if the coverage
goes lower beyond a certain point, indeed redundancy will not help improv-
ing the reliability. Comparison of Figure 11 and Figure 12 also indicates that
redundancy is more useful for improving reliability in the cases where scrub
interval is longer. For systems with fast scrubbing capability, rescheduling
can be a good alternative to redundancy-based solutions.
For performability and throughput-area analysis, table 4 shows the ex-
pected throughput and long-run overall reward calculation for various scrub
intervals with C = 0.99. The rewards are setup so that the area and ex-
pected throughput have equal weights. Both the area and throughput were
normalized between 0 and 1 in order to not skew the reward numbers. For ev-
ery configuration, the maximum throughput (throughput in the initial state)
is used to normalize the throughput for other states in the Markov reward
model. Similarly, the maximum area is used to normalize the other area
values among different configurations. In our model, a reward structure
throughput assigns a normalized throughput reward to all the operational or
degraded states. All the failed safe and failed unsafe states are augmented
with a throughput reward of zero. Steady-state expected throughput (nor-
malized) for a configuration can be analyzed in PRISM using the property
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Table 4: Overall reward calculation
I Config. Normalized Area Norm. Overall
(days) Expected (No. of Area Reward
Throughput LUTs)
1 C1 0.955 1810 0.667 1.432
C2 0.974 2532 0.932 1.045
C3 0.973 1934 0.734 1.326
C4 0.993 2765 1.000 0.993
4 C1 0.811 1810 0.667 1.216
C2 0.876 2532 0.932 0.940
C3 0.856 1934 0.734 1.166
C4 0.931 2765 1.000 0.931
9 C1 0.628 1810 0.667 0.942
C2 0.717 2532 0.932 0.769
C3 0.684 1934 0.734 0.932
C4 0.790 2765 1.000 0.790
Figure 13: Impact of C (coverage) on for performability-area trade-off evaluation for I =
1
as follows and shown in column 3:
Property 5: R {“Expected throughput”} = ? [ S ] - “The expected through-
put of the system”.
Column 4 shows the area of each configuration and their normalized value
is shown in column 5. Column 6 shows the overall area-throughput reward
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Figure 14: Impact of C (coverage) on for performability-area trade-off evaluation for I =
9
(overall reward) for each configuration. The reward for each configuration is
calculated by multiplying the value of column 3 with the reciprocal of the nor-
malized area. Based on the equal reward weighting, configuration C1 which
has no redundancy (spare components), shows the best throughput-area re-
ward for all the values of I. This indicates that the extra reliability provided
by the redundancy is not always useful to suppress the extra area overhead.
However, rescheduling with scrubbing is good enough to serve as a fault re-
covery and repair mechanism in such cases. Another important observation
is that adding a spare adder significantly improves the throughput-area re-
ward, much more than adding a spare multiplier. If performance is the main
concern of the design, then the expected throughput results from column 3
suggests configuration C4 as the best choice to implement. It clearly shows,
how the inclusion of throughput-area metrics can influence design decisions
toward solutions that differs from those resulting from an analysis based on
either dependability (as in Table 3) or performability metric alone. Such an
analysis, using the proposed methodology, can be very useful at early design
stages for designers of safety-critical applications concerned with dependabil-
ity, performance and area constraints.
To analyze the impact of coverage on performability-area trade-off, we
evaluate property 5 for scrub interval I = 1 and show the result in Figure 13.
We find that, from lower to higher coverage, the trend is the same, config-
uration C1 with no redundancy keep dominating the overall reward graph.
This supports the conclusion derived from Table 4 that redundancy is not
always useful to suppress the extra area overhead for all coverage points. In
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contrast, when we redo this experiment for a comparatively delayed scrub
I = 9, we clearly notice the relationship between I and C reflected on the
overall reward as shown in Figure 14. The configuration C1 with no re-
dundancy is still dominating, but the rewards accumulated by configuration
C3 approaches closer to configuration C1 with increasing values of C. In
contrast, for lower coverage values, configuration C2 and configuration C4
accumulate almost similar reward, however the gap between them expands
with increasing values of C. Such phenomena was not observed in Figure 13,
but in Figure 14 it is visible for delayed scrub interval.
6. Conclusion & Future Works
This paper illustrated how probabilistic model checking, a formal verifi-
cation technique which has already been applied to a wide range of domains,
can be used to analyze designs at early stage for space applications. The
design options are modeled using a Markov reward model, that captures the
possible failures, fault detection coverage and repairs possible in high-altitude
radiation environment. Afterwards, a wide range of properties are exhaus-
tively and automatically verified to evaluate the design options, in terms of
throughput, area and dependability. Such analysis is useful to reduce the
overall design cost and effort. Quantitative results from an FIR filter case
study demonstrated how the proposed methodology can be applied to drive
the design process. The PRISMmodel checker includes multiple model check-
ing engines, the majority of which are based on symbolic implementations
(using binary decision diagrams and their extensions). These engines en-
ables the probabilistic verification of models of up to 1010 states (on average,
PRISM handles models with up to 107− 108 states). PRISM also features a
variety of advanced techniques such as abstraction refinement and symmetry
reduction. It is worth mentioning that it also supports approximate/statisti-
cal model checking through a discrete event simulation engine. So considering
the capability of PRISM model checker, it is possible to analyze large sys-
tems using our methodology. However, since the CDFG rescheduling part of
the methodology is not fully automated yet, this currently restricts us from
doing so. Future works include the automation of this process to generate the
PRISM code for a given configuration automatically, and to analyze designs
in the presence of other kinds of possible failures due to SEUs, such as aging,
electromigration, hot electron effects, Negative-Bias Temperature Instability
(NBTI) and Single-Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs).
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